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The report is the result of a joint effort of the United States Department of Education and the United States Secret Service to address the problem of school violence. Taken together, the findings from the Safe School Initiative s...
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The report is the result of a joint effort of the United States Department of Education and the United States Secret Service to address the problem of school violence. Taken together, the findings from the Safe School Initiative suggest that some future attacks may be preventable. Most incidents of targeted school violence were thought out and planned in advance. The attackers behavior suggested that they were planning or preparing for an attack. Prior to most incidents, the attackers peers knew the attack was to occur. And most attackers were not invisible, but already were of concern to people in their lives. In light of these findings, the use of a threat assessment approach may be a promising strategy for preventing a school-based attack. Educators, law enforcement officials and others with public safety responsibilities may be able to prevent some incidents of targeted school violence if they know what information to look for and what to do with such information when it is found. In sum, these officials may benefit from focusing their efforts on formulating strategies for preventing these attacks in two principal areas: developing the capacity to pick up on and evaluate available or knowable information that might indicate that there is a risk of a targeted school attack; and, employing the results of these risk evaluations or threat assessments in developing strategies to prevent potential school attacks from occurring.
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Get a GRiP (Gravitational Risk Procedure) on risk by using an approach inspired by the physics of gravitational forces between body masses. In April 2010, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Special Events staff (Protective Secur...
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Get a GRiP (Gravitational Risk Procedure) on risk by using an approach inspired by the physics of gravitational forces between body masses. In April 2010, U.S. Department of Homeland Security Special Events staff (Protective Security Advisors (PSAs)) expressed concern about how to calculate risk given measures of consequence, vulnerability, and threat. The PSAs believed that it is not 'right' to assign zero risk, as a multiplicative formula would imply, to cases in which the threat is reported to be extremely small, and perhaps could even be assigned a value of zero, but for which consequences and vulnerability are potentially high. They needed a different way to aggregate the components into an overall measure of risk. To address these concerns, GRiP was proposed and developed. The inspiration for GRiP is Sir Isaac Newton's Universal Law of Gravitation: the attractive force between two bodies is directly proportional to the product of their masses and inversely proportional to the squares of the distance between them. The total force on one body is the sum of the forces from 'other bodies' that influence that body. In the case of risk, the 'other bodies' are the components of risk (R): consequence, vulnerability, and threat (which we denote as C, V, and T, respectively). GRiP treats risk as if it were a body within a cube.
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Deterrence means preventing another's actions by influencing their decision making process. Nuclear deterrence was successfully accomplished during the Cold War by holding the adversary's valuable assets at risk by targeting them ...
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Deterrence means preventing another's actions by influencing their decision making process. Nuclear deterrence was successfully accomplished during the Cold War by holding the adversary's valuable assets at risk by targeting them with nuclear weapons, a policy known as mutually assured destruction (MAD). In this case neither player attacks the other, because the ultimate outcome is self-destruction. Deterrence based upon MAD is largely ineffective against sub-state actors who may have few if any assets, the location of which may be unknown. Furthermore, the threat of destroying their assets may only serve to strengthen their motivation to do more stealthy violence, the threat being interpreted as a taunt. The key to establishing deterrence is understanding the adversary's decision process.
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This report is a brief update to the Minnesota Drug Threat Assessment, which is a strategic assessment of the status and outlook of the drug threat to Minnesota. Analytical judgment determined the threat posed by each drug type or...
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This report is a brief update to the Minnesota Drug Threat Assessment, which is a strategic assessment of the status and outlook of the drug threat to Minnesota. Analytical judgment determined the threat posed by each drug type or category, taking into account the most current quantitative and qualitative information on availability, demand, production or cultivation, transportation, and distribution, as well as the effects of a particular drug on abusers and society as a whole. While NDIC sought to incorporate the latest available information, a time lag often exists between collection and publication of data. NDIC anticipates that this update will be useful to policymakers, law enforcement personnel, and treatment providers at the federal, state, and local levels.
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This report is a brief update to the Kentucky Drug Threat Assessment, which is a strategic assessment of the status and outlook of the drug threat to Kentucky. Analytical judgment determined the threat posed by each drug type or c...
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This report is a brief update to the Kentucky Drug Threat Assessment, which is a strategic assessment of the status and outlook of the drug threat to Kentucky. Analytical judgment determined the threat posed by each drug type or category, taking into account the most current quantitative and qualitative information on availability, demand, production or cultivation, transportation, and distribution, as well as the effects of a particular drug on abusers and society as a whole. While NDIC sought to incorporate the latest available information, a time lag often exists between collection and publication of data. NDIC anticipates that this update will be useful to policymakers, law enforcement personnel, and treatment providers at the federal, state, and local levels.
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This report is a brief update to the Wisconsin Drug Threat Assessment, which is a strategic assessment of the status and outlook of the drug threat to Wisconsin. Analytical judgment determined the threat posed by each drug type or...
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This report is a brief update to the Wisconsin Drug Threat Assessment, which is a strategic assessment of the status and outlook of the drug threat to Wisconsin. Analytical judgment determined the threat posed by each drug type or category, taking into account the most current quantitative and qualitative information on availability, demand, production or cultivation, transportation, and distribution, as well as the effects of a particular drug on abusers and society as a whole. While NDIC sought to incorporate the latest available information, a time lag often exists between collection and publication of data. NDIC anticipates that this update will be useful to policymakers, law enforcement personnel, and treatment providers at the federal, state, and local levels.
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$Contents: Acknowledgments$ Introduction$ History and Background$ A New Definition$ Human Security and Threat Assessment$ Conclusion and Recommendations$ Annex: Lessons for policy from the USAID/CERTI research project and Bibliography.
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Pursuant to Initiative Three of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, DHS is engaging in an exercise to demonstrate a suite of technologies that could be included in the next generation of the Departmentfs EINSTEIN ...
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Pursuant to Initiative Three of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, DHS is engaging in an exercise to demonstrate a suite of technologies that could be included in the next generation of the Departmentfs EINSTEIN network security program. This demonstration, (commonly referred to as the 'Initiative Three Exercise' or, more simply, as 'the Exercise') will use a modified complement of system components currently providing the EINSTEIN 1 and EINSTEIN 2 capabilities, as well as a DHS test deployment of technology developed by the National Security Agency (NSA) that includes an intrusion prevention capability (collectively referred to as 'the Exercise technology'). The purpose of the Exercise is to demonstrate the ability of an existing Internet Service Provider that is a designated as a Trusted Internet Connection Access Provider (TICAP) to select and redirect Internet traffic from a single participating government agency through the Exercise technology, for US-CERT to apply intrusion detection and prevention measures to that traffic and for US-CERT to generate automated alerts about selected cyber threats. This PIA is being conducted because the Exercise will analyze Internet traffic which may contain personally identifiable information (PII).
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A model for the estimation of the risk of diversion of weapons-capable materials was developed. It represents both the threat of diversion and site vulnerability as a product of a small number of variables (two to eight), each of ...
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A model for the estimation of the risk of diversion of weapons-capable materials was developed. It represents both the threat of diversion and site vulnerability as a product of a small number of variables (two to eight), each of which can take on a small number (two to four) of qualitatively defined (but quantitatively implemented) values. The values of the overall threat and vulnerability variables are then converted to threat and vulnerability categories. The threat and vulnerability categories are used to define the likelihood of diversion, also defined categorically. The evaluator supplies an estimate of the consequences of a diversion, defined categorically, but with the categories based on the IAEA Attractiveness levels. Likelihood and Consequences categories are used to define the Risk, also defined categorically. The threat, vulnerability, and consequences input provided by the evaluator contains a representation of his/her uncertainty in each variable assignment which is propagated all the way through to the calculation of the Risk categories.
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A model for the estimation of the risk of diversion of weapons-capable materials211 was developed. It represents both the threat of diversion and site vulnerability 211 as a product of a small number of variables (two to eight), e...
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A model for the estimation of the risk of diversion of weapons-capable materials211 was developed. It represents both the threat of diversion and site vulnerability 211 as a product of a small number of variables (two to eight), each of which can 211 take on a small number (two to four) of qualitatively defined (but quantitatively 211 implemented) values. The values of the overall threat and vulnerability variables 211 are then converted to threat and vulnerability categories. The threat and 211 vulnerability categories are used to define the likelihood of diversion, also 211 defined categorically. The evaluator supplies an estimate of the consequences of 211 a diversion, defined categorically, but with the categories based on the IAEA 211 Attractiveness levels. Likelihood and Consequences categories are used to define 211 the Risk, also defined categorically. The threat, vulnerability, and consequences 211 input provided by the evaluator contains a representation of his/her uncertainty 211 in each variable assignment which is propagated all the way through to the 211 calculation of the Risk categories.
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